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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
federal jurisdiction over the subject matter, if the courts fail to have the
necessary independent jurisdiction over the affirmative claim, a counter-
claim will be limited to "a claim arising out of the same transaction as
that upon which suit was brought."23
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN
RESIDENT AND NON-RESIDENT USERS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
A non-resident user of the water and sewage system sought to enjoin
the municipality from raising the water rate one and a half times the rate
charged residents and raising the sewage rate to double that charged residents.
Held, the municipality could not charge non-residents higher taxes solely
because they were residing outside of the corporate limits. City of Texarkana
v. Wiggins, 246 S.W.2d 622 (Texas 1952).
The earliest cases on the reasonableness of rates dealt chiefly, if not
exclusively, with private corporations.' As a result, it is well settled that a
private corporation doing a public service cannot charge discriminatory or
unreasonable rates to customers in the same class.2 With the development
of municipal ownership of formerly private utility companies, the question
arose as to the rights and duties of a city in regard to the rates charged.
These rights and duties, in general, have been decided to be neither more
nor less than those held by a private corporation." However, when faced
with the instant problem, discrimination against non-residents, courts4 have
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (g); see FED. R. Civ. P. 82. See note 10 supra.
1. San Diego Land & Town Co. v. City of National City, 74 Fed 79 (C.C.S.D. Cal.
1896); City of Council of Montgomery v. Capital City Water Co., 92 Ala. 376, 9 So.
337 (1890); City Council of Montgomery v. Montgomery Waterworks Co., 77 Ala. 248
(1884); Spring Valley Waterworks v. City and County of San Francisco, 52 Cal. 111
1877 ; Burlington Waterworks Co. v. City of Burlington, 43 Kan. 725, 23 Pac. 1068
1890); Nicholasville Water Co. v. Board of Councilmen of Town of Nicholasville, 36
.W. 549 (Ky. 1896); Borough of Carlisle v. Carlisle Gas & Water Co., 4 Atl. 179
(Pa. 1886).
2. Danville v. Danville Water Co., 180 Ill. 235, 54 N.E. 224 (1899); State ex rel
Latshaw v. Water & Light Comrn'rs, 105 Minn. 472, 117 N.W. 827 (1908); Griffin v.
Goldsboro Water Co., 122 N.C. 206, 30 S.E. 319 (1898); Armour Packing Co. v. Edison
Electric Illuminating Co., 115 App. Div. 51, 100 N.Y. Supp. 605 (3d Dep't 1926); Cin-
cinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. Bowling Green, 57 Ohio St. 336, 49 N.E. 121 (1896).
3. Montgomery v. Greene, 180 Ala. 322, 60 So. 900 (1913); Nourse v. Los Angeles.
25 Cal. App. 384, 143 Pac. 801 (1914); American Aniline Products v. Lock Haven, 288
Pa. 420, 135 At]. 726 (19271; Galveston v. Kenner, 111 Tex. 484, 240 S.W. 894 (1922).
4. City of Phoenix v. Kasun, 97 P.2d 210 (Ariz. 1939); Durant v. City of Beverly
Hills, 39 Cal. App.2d 133, 102 P.2d 759 (Cal. 1940); City of Englewood v. City &
County r'f Denver, 123 Colo. 290, 229 P.2d 667 (1951); Cooper v. Tampa Electric Co.,
154 Fla. 410, 17 So.2d 785 (1944); Barr v. City Council of Augusta, 206 Ca. 753, 58
S.E.2d 873 (1950); Davisworth v. City of Lexington, 311 Ky. 606, 224 S.W.2d 649
(1949); Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. J. E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc., 307 Ky. 413, 211 S.W.2d 122 (1948); Atlantic Const. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 230
N.C. 365, 53 S.E.2d 165 (1949); Borough of Ambridge v. Pennsylvania Public Utility
Comm'n, 137 Pa. Super. Ct. 50, 8 A.2d 429 (1939); Childs v. City of Columbia, 87 S.C.
566, 70 S.E. 296 (1911); City of Sweetwater v. Hamner, 259 S.W. 191 (Tex. Civ. App.
1923).
CASES NOTED
almost unanimously said that "the same yardstick as to what is reasonable
is not ... applied . .. ."I It has been decided that a city ordinance requir-
ing non-resident users of water to pay double the rate charged to residents
was not unreasonable or discriminatory.6 A more recent case held that a
municipality did not have a duty to furnish water to non-residents at any
particular rate or to furnish them water at all, despite the existence of an
agreement with the previous private owner of the utility.'
The majority in the instant case, cited a number of cases8 which admit-
tedly were not on point. With these authorities the court announced the
broad general rule that a municipal corporation, just like a private corporation
doing a public service, cannot charge discriminatory or unreasonable rates to
customers in the same class. Avoiding the question of whether or not the
municipality has a duty to furnish non-residents with water, but assuming
that it has no such duty, the court resorted to two cases9 to establish that
the greater power of being able to refuse water does not carry with it the
lesser power to set any kind of rate when it does decide to supply the water.'
The court argued that discrimination cannot be justified on the basis that
the residents pay taxes which are being used to pay for the acquisition of the
water system. It asserted the principle that corporate limits of a municipal-
ity, of themselves, do not furnish a reasonable basis for rate differentiation.
The opinion puts a further burden on the municipality by requiring it
to justify the difference in the rates. The court refuted the contention that
the statute" authorized municipalities to furnish non-residents with utilities
under such terms and conditions as may appear to be for the best
interest of such town or city," permits such discrimination. It ruled that
even if the statute does give a municipality the right to discriminate when
it first offers service to non-residents, it is not permitted any further rate
discrimination.
Granted, that the intention of the majority, in its desire to prevent a
return ". . . to the primitive state of development in utility control when
rates were determined by friendship and political power or pressure,"' 2 is a
desirable one, it is submitted that the well reasoned dissent, supported by
5. 12 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 35.37 (3d ed. 1950).
6. Barr v. City Council of Augusta, 206 Ca. 753, 58 S.E.2d 823 (1950).
7. City of Englewood v. City & County of Denver, 123 Colo. 290, 229 P.2d 667
(1951).
8. Highland Park v. Guthrie, 269 S.W. 193 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Galveston
v. Kenner, 111 Tex. 484, 240 S.W. 894 (1922); Houston v. Lockwood Investment Co.,
144 S.W. 685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
9. Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922); Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1909).
10. Since both of these cases involve the question of whether or not the sovereign
power of a state to regulate corporations includes the power to contravene powers belong-
ing to the federal government, it seems that they are not authorities for the proposition
stated in the main case.
11. Tx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1108 (3) (1914).
12. 246 S.W.2d 622, 627 (1952).
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the weight of authority, 3 is the better view. Conceding that this permits
discrimination, it seems that the opposite rule would be even more unjust,
in that it would discriminate against residents of a municipality who are, in
reality, bearing the greater burden of paying for the service. Since a munici-
pality cannot tax non-residents, it should at least be able to demand higher
utility rates, and it certainly should not be saddled with the burden of show-
ing that the rates established are not unreasonable. rhat burden should be
left with the party alleging it.14
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS - EFFECT OF COUNTER
SIGNATURE ON FORGED INDORSEMENT - IMPLIED
VALIDATION
Appellant, check-cashing service, sent appellce's check, drawn by its
president, but not counter-signed,' through for collection. Drawee bank
secured the signature of appellee's comptroller, and paid appellant's bank.
Appellant, upon notice of the deposit, paid value for the check. Upon
discovery that check bore a forged indorsement, appellee instituted action to
determine the respective rights to the fund. Held, for appellant. Where a
co-signer signs a check bearing a forged indorsement, the co-signer impliedly
guarantees the validity of the endorsement, and "engages that on due
presentment the instrument will be accepted or paid, or both . *"2 Block
v. Howard Sober Inc., 60 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1952).
Generally, a forged indorseient passes no title,3 even if the subsequent
transferee is a bona fide holder without notice.4 The drawer of a check can
recover monies paid on a forged indorseinent from the drawee or any
subsequent holder of the check.,' The drawee bank, unable to charge the
13. Supra note 4.
14. Durant v. City of Beverly Hills, 102 P.2d 759 (Cal. 1940); Cooper v. Tampa
Electric Co., 154 Fla. 410, 17 So.2d 785 (1944); Louisville & Jefferson County Metropol-
itan Sewer Dist. v. 1. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 307 Ky. 413, 211 S.W.2d 122 (1948).
1. 5A MIIIIE, BANKS AND BANKING § 171 (1950) (bank cannot pay a check
requiring a counter-signature if one is lacking. The check is invalid).
2. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 61; FLA. STAT. § 674.63 (1951).
3. Ocala Nat. Farm Loan Ass'n v. Munro & Chambliss Nat. Bank, 89 Fla. 242,
103 So. 609 (1925); Hayes v. Midland Credit Co., 173 Minn. 554, 218 N.W. 106
(1928).
4. Warren v. Smith, 35 Utah 455, 100 Pac. 1069 (1909). But ef. United States v.
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 293 U.S. 340 (1934).
5. Farmers' State Bank in Merkel v. United States, 62 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1932);
Seidman v. North Camden Trust Co., 122 N.J.L. 580, 7 A.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1939);
Talbot v. Bank of Rochester, 1 Hill 295 (N.Y. 1841); Labor Bank & Trust Co. v. Adam,
23 S.W.2d 814 (TeK. Civ. App. 1930). See BEUrEL'S BRANNAN, NEGorIABLE INSTRU-
MENT LAw 445 (7th ed. 1948).
6. Borserine v. Maryland Casualty Co., 112 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1940); Talbot v.
Bank of Rochester, 1 Hill 295 (N.Y. 1841); Life Ins. Co. of Virginia v. Edisto Nat.
Bank of Orangeburg, 166 S.C. 505, 165 S.E. 178 (1932); United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co, v. First Nat. Bank of El Paso, 93 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
